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Abstract
Background: Southeast Asia has been the focus of considerable investment in pandemic influenza preparedness. Given the
wide variation in socio-economic conditions, health system capacity across the region is likely to impact to varying degrees
on pandemic mitigation operations. We aimed to estimate and compare the resource gaps, and potential mortalities
associated with those gaps, for responding to pandemic influenza within and between six territories in Asia.
Methods and Findings: We collected health system resource data from Cambodia, Indonesia (Jakarta and Bali), Lao PDR,
Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. We applied a mathematical transmission model to simulate a ‘‘mild-to-moderate’’ pandemic
influenza scenario to estimate resource needs, gaps, and attributable mortalities at province level within each territory. The
results show that wide variations exist in resource capacities between and within the six territories, with substantial
mortalities predicted as a result of resource gaps (referred to here as ‘‘avoidable’’ mortalities), particularly in poorer areas.
Severe nationwide shortages of mechanical ventilators were estimated to be a major cause of avoidable mortalities in all
territories except Taiwan. Other resources (oseltamivir, hospital beds and human resources) are inequitably distributed
within countries. Estimates of resource gaps and avoidable mortalities were highly sensitive to model parameters defining
the transmissibility and clinical severity of the pandemic scenario. However, geographic patterns observed within and across
territories remained similar for the range of parameter values explored.
Conclusions: The findings have important implications for where (both geographically and in terms of which resource
types) investment is most needed, and the potential impact of resource mobilization for mitigating the disease burden of an
influenza pandemic. Effective mobilization of resources across administrative boundaries could go some way towards
minimizing avoidable deaths.
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Introduction
Recent experience from the 2009-H1N1 pandemic highlights
how health system capacities, even in developed countries, can be
stretched by relatively mild pandemic scenarios [1–3]. Indeed, the
vast majority of previous health system analyses in relation to
pandemic influenza have focused on developed countries [1,3–11],
while the capacity of health systems in low and middle income
countries remains largely unstudied. Paradoxically, understanding
outbreak response capacity in low and middle-income countries is
arguably of greater importance than that in developed countries,
not only because health systems are weaker [12], but also because
many of these countries are in regions where the risk of emerging
infectious diseases is highest [13]. Moreover, these countries may
suffer disproportionately because of associations between morbid-
ity, pandemic influenza and poverty [14].
Proposed strategies for pandemic preparedness in many
countries frequently focus on development and acquisition of
pandemic vaccines and stockpiling and distribution of antiviral
drugs [15–16]. In the Southeast Asia region, while surveillance
and outbreak response capacities have been strengthened in hope
of early detection and control of outbreaks, there has been much
less investment into preparing health systems for pandemic
mitigation [17]. Modeling studies have been used to inform
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optimum intervention strategies for responding to pandemic
influenza, but often neglect to take into account feasibility of
health systems to implement such a response and the potential
impact of resource shortages on the pandemic burden.
Investigation of health system capacity in East and Southeast
Asia is of particular interest, not only given the fertile conditions
for the emergence and spread of new diseases [13,18], but also the
wide socio-economic inequalities within the region, and focus of
investment by the international community into pandemic
influenza preparedness [19]. Resource gaps for a pandemic
response are likely to be wide and vary greatly between and
within countries in Asia [20]. But exactly how wide are these gaps,
what are the consequences of the gaps in terms of the pandemic
disease burden, and to what extent could these consequences be
mitigated by improving resource allocation and mobilization?
To address these questions, we conducted a health systems
analysis across six Asian countries and territories with widely
varying socioeconomic conditions: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
PDR, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. In this analysis, mathe-
matical modeling and health system resource data collected across
the six territories were used to estimate and compare, within and
across countries, the resource gaps, and potential consequences of
those gaps in terms of expected mortalities, for a hypothetical
pandemic influenza scenario.
Methods
This study was conducted as part of the AsiaFluCap project
(www.asiaflucap.org), the overall aim of which is to conduct health
systems analyses to support capacity development for responding
to pandemic influenza across six countries and territories in Asia,
specifically: Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Taiwan, Thailand
and Vietnam.
Health system resource data
For this comparative analysis we focus on four key health system
resources: antiviral drugs (specifically oseltamivir), hospital beds,
mechanical ventilators and healthcare workers (doctors and nurses),
chosen due to their critical importance for responding to pandemic
influenza. These resources, along with over 50 other resource items
relating to health system infrastructure, equipment, materials, and
human resources, were selected through a systematic literature
review and a Delphi consensus process by a panel of 24 experts, as
described in [21]. Quantities of these resource items were
enumerated during March to September 2009 through question-
naires administered to hospitals and health offices in all districts of
each of the six study countries (except Indonesia, where data were
collected only from districts in Jakarta and Bali due to the vast
geographic scale of the country). Additional questionnaires were
sent to ministries of health to capture central stockpiles.
We received 100% response rates from hospitals and district
health offices in Cambodia. Overall response rates from district
health offices were more than 95% in Viet Nam and Indonesia
(Jakarta and Bali), 86% in Lao PDR, 72% in Taiwan, and 59% in
Thailand. The response rates for hospital questionnaires were
slightly lower at 93% for Indonesia and Vietnam, 70% for Lao
PDR, and approximately 46% for Thailand and Taiwan. Data
from the questionnaires were double-entered into an Excel
database. Missing values, due to non-responses or incomplete
questionnaires, were extrapolated using linear prediction models,
specific to each country and resource item, based on a number of
district characteristics such as total number of hospital beds or
public hospital beds, population size, and geographic location
(region/province). For oseltamivir and ventilators, two-step models
were used to first estimate the likelihood of having any oseltamivir or
ventilators, and then to predict the number of these items.
Extrapolation of missing data was carried out in STATA version 11.
Epidemic modeling and links to health systems resources
In order to estimate health system resource needs and gaps for a
pandemic influenza scenario, we used a mathematical model
previously developed as part of the AsiaFluCap project to simulate
the transmission dynamics of a pandemic influenza outbreak [22].
Full details and equations of the model can be found in [22], and are
summarized in Text S1. Briefly, the model is based on a
deterministic SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered/re-
moved) model described by differential equations tracking number
of people in each compartment over time. Given that the primary
aim of this analysis was to provide relative estimates of resource gaps
within and across countries, rather than to accurately simulate the
spread of pandemic influenza throughout each country, the model
structure was kept relatively simple, with homogeneous mixing
patterns and no age-structure assumed within the modeled
population. However, novel complexity is incorporated through
making parameters describing the clinical course of infected
individuals conditional upon the availability of certain key health
system resources (antivirals, beds, and ventilators). Thus we could
obtain relative indications of the consequences of resource shortages
on the pandemic disease burden, specifically in terms of ‘‘avoidable
deaths’’, which we define as deaths that would not have occurred in
the presence of sufficient resources.
The infectious compartment of the model was subdivided into
three groups based on clinical severity: asymptomatic, mild and
severe infections. All asymptomatically and mildly infected patients
were assumed to recover, while severe cases were at risk of death
and were assumed to need antiviral treatment and hospitalized care,
although whether they received either of these depended upon the
availability of oseltamivir and hospital beds, respectively. Treatment
with antivirals and hospitalization were assumed to reduce the
infectious period and the probability of death for severe cases.
Furthermore, a proportion of severe cases are assumed to require
mechanical ventilation, which they will receive as long as ventilators
are available, otherwise these cases would die.
The model parameters describing transmissibility and clinical
severity were chosen based on data from the 2009-H1N1
pandemic, with a basic reproduction number of 1.32 [23–24].
Under the parameter values chosen (see Table S1 and [22]), in a
population with sufficient resources (i.e. when there are no
shortages of oseltamivir, hospital beds, or ventilators), the scenario
predicts an overall attack rate of 35.6%, a clinical attack rate of
24.9%, a peak prevalence (of symptomatic cases) of 0.94%, and a
case fatality rate of 0.018%. In the absence of any resources, the
case fatality rate is substantially higher at 0.029%, while attack
rates and peak prevalence remain very similar.
Estimating resource needs, gaps, and associated
mortality
In our baseline scenario, resource gaps were estimated assuming
that 12% of ‘‘general’’ hospital resources (beds, ventilators and
human resources) are available for care of pandemic influenza
cases, with the remaining 88% required for maintaining essential
healthcare services, as in a previous pilot study for Thailand [20],
and based on previous reports [25–26]. We also assumed that, in
the event of a pandemic all available oseltamivir doses would be
dedicated to severe influenza cases. These assumptions regarding
resource spare capacity and oseltamivir usage were relaxed in a
multivariate uncertainty analysis (described below). The resource
data were aggregated at provincial level for all countries except
Health Systems and Pandemic Influenza in Asia
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Taiwan, where they were aggregated at county level, and
Indonesia, where the data were kept at district level. (Counties
in Taiwan and districts in Indonesia are of comparable population
size to the provinces of the other four countries.) We then ran the
model separately for each province (Lao PDR, Cambodia,
Thailand, Vietnam), county (Taiwan) and district (Indonesia),
with the appropriate resources for each of these administrative
areas, assuming a closed population and that resources could not
be shared between these areas in a timely manner. For the
purposes of narrative flow, we henceforth use the term ‘‘province’’
for counties in Taiwan. All simulations started with one mild case
entering a completely susceptible population.
In addition to running the model with the available resources,
based on the survey data, we also ran the model with unlimited
resources, in order to calculate resource needs, and thus also the
resource gaps (or indeed surpluses) by comparing with the resource
availability data. The needed number of hospital beds, ventilators
and humans resources were estimated from the peak number of
cases requiring hospitalization and ventilation, while the needed
number of oseltamivir doses was calculated from total number of
severe cases occurring over the duration of the outbreak (full
details on assumptions of resource depletion rates are detailed in
[22], and summarized in Text S1). By comparing the number of
deaths predicted by simulations with sufficient resources with those
from simulations using actual resource data, we also estimated the
number of deaths due to resource gaps, which we term as
‘‘avoidable deaths’’.
A multivariate uncertainty analysis was conducted to approx-
imate uncertainty surrounding avoidable deaths in light of
uncertainty in resource spare capacity and effectiveness, which
may vary between settings. Specifically, the proportion of
‘‘general’’ healthcare resources within each province/district that
would be available to care for pandemic influenza patients was
allowed to vary between 5–20%, and parameters describing the
effectiveness of each resource for reducing the risk of death in cases
requiring those resources were allowed to vary independently
between a wide range of 20–80%. We also explored the impact of
relaxing the assumption that oseltamivir administration is
restricted to severe influenza cases, by allowing between 0–5%
of mild cases to be treated. One hundred combinations of values
were chosen randomly from these ranges using Latin hypercube
sampling, and simulations were run using each combination. The
medians, interquartile ranges (IQR) and 95th percentile ranges of
model outcomes were then calculated across the simulations.
Since the aim of this study was to compare resource capacities
across geographic areas and resource types, rather than to evaluate
how transmission dynamics may vary across geographic areas,
epidemiological parameters of the model were kept fixed in the
multivariate uncertainty analysis to ensure comparability of
resource capacity outcomes. However, due to the unpredictability
of pandemic scenarios, we also explored model outcomes for a
range of values for R0 and for the severe clinical attack rate in a
separate univariate sensitivity analysis.
The model was coded and run in R version 2.10.1, using the
‘‘simecol’’ package [27] with the Runge-Kutta 4th order algorithm
for numerical integration of the differential equations. ArcGIS
version 10 was used to map the calculated resource gaps and
avoidable mortalities at provincial level.
Results
Resource gaps
Figure 1 presents the geographical distribution of estimated
resource gaps across provinces (or districts in the case of
Indonesia) in each study country for the modeled pandemic
influenza scenario, under our baseline assumptions and point
estimates for parameter values. The corresponding statistical
distributions of resource capacities across areas within each
country can be found in Figure S1. A summary of overall
resource gaps for each country is presented in Table 1. There was
substantial variation in resource gaps both between and within
countries, and across resources types (Figures 1 and S1). Overall,
the biggest gaps were generally seen in Cambodia and Lao PDR,
particularly when standardized by population size, with almost all
provinces in these countries displaying gaps in all resources, with
the exception of nurses which were estimated to be sufficient in
approximately half of the provinces in these countries. In
contrast, relatively few provinces in Taiwan were estimated to
have gaps, at least in general health system resources (beds,
ventilators, and human resources), with quantities of these
resources often considerably above those predicted to be needed
for this scenario. Nevertheless, almost half of provinces in Taiwan
were predicted to have insufficient oseltamivir supplies to treat all
severe cases (although it should be noted that the results in
Figures 1 and S1 do not account for central stockpiles which
might be mobilized in the event of a pandemic, as discussed
later).
Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam generally displayed a more
mixed picture. Results were comparable between Vietnam and
Indonesia, with relatively few provinces of Vietnam (7?9%) and
only one district of Jakarta (and none in Bali), estimated to have
insufficient oseltamivir to treat all severe cases, with supplies of this
antiviral drug comparably high across most other areas in these
countries. Healthcare workers were also predicted to be mostly
sufficient in Vietnam, with only 3?1% and 1?6% of provinces
predicted to have a shortage of doctors and nurses, respectively,
for this scenario. However, gaps in hospital beds were observed in
over half of provinces in Vietnam and districts of Jakarta and Bali,
and all of these provinces displayed a shortage of mechanical
ventilators. Indeed, of all the resources, the largest gaps were
observed in ventilators across all countries except Taiwan
(Table 1).
Thailand had the second highest number of ventilators (absolute
and per capita) after Taiwan, but a shortage of this resource was
nevertheless predicted in over 80% of Thai provinces. A very
heterogeneous pattern was observed in Thailand, with around
50% of provinces showing a shortage of hospital beds and
oseltamivir, while many other provinces showed a clear ‘‘surplus’’
of the latter. Meanwhile, a shortage of medical doctors was
predicted in over 80% of Thai provinces, with gaps in doctors
comparable to those Lao PDR and Cambodia (Table 1). The
number of nurses in Thai provinces was estimated to be somewhat
more sufficient, however. A fairly distinct geographical pattern of
resource gaps was evident in Thailand, particularly for oseltamivir
and ventilators, with north-eastern (and some southern) provinces
showing shortages more comparable with those in neighboring
Lao PDR and Cambodia than with other Thai provinces
(Figure 1).
It should be noted that estimates of gaps in beds, ventilators and
human resources were highly dependent on the spare capacity of
resources assumed to be available to care for pandemic influenza
patients. For example, if spare capacity was assumed to be 5%,
rather than 12%, then even in Taiwan most areas would suffer
gaps in these resources for the modeled scenario. Furthermore, use
of oseltamivir on even a fairly small proportion (5%) of mild cases,
resulted in much faster depletion of this resource, such that all
countries are predicted to experience a shortage of oseltamivir for
treating all severe cases.
Health Systems and Pandemic Influenza in Asia
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Consequences of resource gaps on pandemic-associated
mortality
The geographic distribution of avoidable deaths, estimated by
calculating the number of deaths that would be prevented by
filling all resource gaps in each province, and standardized by
population size, is presented in Figure 2. (A corresponding map
showing absolute numbers of estimated avoidable death is given in
Figure S2.) Figure 3 shows estimated avoidable death rates
attributable to gaps in each resource type (antivirals, beds and
ventilators) aggregated across all provinces in each country, and
accounting for uncertainty in resource effectiveness and spare
capacity. Avoidable deaths for a given resource gap were estimated
by calculating the number of deaths that would be prevented by
filling that resource gap only.
Figures 2 and 3 highlight how resource gaps could have a
substantial impact on mortality rates during an influenza
pandemic. A combination of the large population size and
shortage of ventilators results in the estimation that, out of the
five countries for which nationwide data were collected, Vietnam
would have the highest total number of avoidable deaths.
However, the results for Jakarta and Bali suggest that Indonesia
would have the highest avoidable death toll if the data is
extrapolated across the entire population of this country. When
standardized by population size, the highest rates of avoidable
deaths were estimated in Cambodia and Lao PDR, accounting for
over half of all pandemic-associated mortalities in these countries.
The median avoidable death rates for these countries were over 15
times higher than that for Taiwan, where a relatively low
proportion (median: 7.6%, IQR: 5.5–10.7%) of total deaths was
estimated to be due to resource gaps. Almost all avoidable deaths
in Taiwan were predicted to be due to local shortages of
oseltamivir. In all other countries shortages of ventilators were
estimated to be the biggest cause of avoidable deaths (Figure 3). In
Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, this result was largely robust
to uncertainty surrounding resource effectiveness and spare
capacity. For Cambodia and Thailand, however, the uncertainty
analysis suggested that gaps in oseltamivir might also be a main
cause of avoidable deaths (Figure 3). When adding an additional
layer of uncertainty to the model assumptions, by allowing for up
to 5% of mild cases to be treated with oseltamivir, the increased
shortages of the latter further increased uncertainty surrounding
the relative importance of gaps in oseltamivir (Figure S3). Given
such uncertainties and the sensitivity of results to model
assumptions, the proportion of mortalities that can be attributed
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of estimated health system resource gaps for a modeled pandemic influenza scenario. Gaps are
mapped for oseltamivir (A), hospital beds (B), mechanical ventilators (C), and healthcare workers (pooled number of doctors and nurses; D). Areas
shaded according to values#0 represent areas where a resource gap is predicted. Gaps are standardized by population size and mapped at province
level for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam, at county level for Taiwan, and at district level for Jakarta and Bali in Indonesia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.g001
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to gaps in specific resources should be interpreted with some
caution.
A clear negative correlation was observed between estimated
avoidable mortality rates and GDP per capita at country level
(Figure 4A). Total funds per capita committed by donors towards
avian and human influenza for each country, up to December
2009 [28] were positively correlated with avoidable mortality rates
(Figure 4B).
Resource distribution and mobilization
Within many countries it was evident that, while at least some
provinces displayed resources gaps, other provinces were estimated to
have more than sufficient resources for responding to the modeled
scenario, with an overall ‘‘surplus’’ of some resources in several
countries (Table 1). Furthermore, central stockpiles of oseltamivir
were present in all countries from which data on this could be
obtained. Thus we also investigated the proportion of avoidable
deaths that might be averted in each country if the total available
resources were equitably distributed across provinces according to
provincial population size (Figure 5). When accounting for central
stockpiles of oseltamivir, the overall supply of this drug was estimated
to be sufficient to treat all severe cases in all countries (Table 1). Thus
it was estimated that, in each country (except for Vietnam, and
Jakarta and Bali, where provincial supplies of oseltamivir are already
relatively high), effective mobilization of oseltamivir across adminis-
trative areas could potentially avert a significant proportion of the
avoidable deaths estimated under current resource distributions (up
to 100% of avoidable mortalities in Taiwan; Figure 5).
The (less feasible) scenario of redistributing available beds and
ventilators according to provincial need within each country was
generally estimated to have less of an impact on the number of
avoidable deaths, compared to mobilization of oseltamivir
(Figure 5). In the case of ventilators, this highlights how the large
numbers of deaths attributed to gaps in this resource (Figure 3) are
mostly due to overall nationwide shortages of ventilators, rather
than an inequitable distribution of ventilators within most
countries. In Thailand, however, if all ventilators were distributed
in proportion to provincial population sizes, the model predicts
around 30% (IQR: 21–41%) fewer avoidable deaths than the
number predicted under the observed ventilator distribution.
Sensitivity of results to pandemic severity
Estimates of resource gaps, and thus also avoidable mortalities,
were very sensitive to the severity of the modeled pandemic
scenario in relation to transmissibility and proportion of cases
requiring hospitalization (Figure S4). A sensitivity analysis showed
that under more severe (yet still plausible) pandemic scenarios,
even Taiwan could experience substantial deaths due to shortages
of hospital resources (Figure S4A and S4C). Furthermore, as the
severity of the scenario increased, so too did the proportion of
avoidable deaths that were attributable to gaps in hospital bed
capacity (shown for Cambodia in Figure S4B and S4D). It is
important to note, however, that for the ranges of values explored
for the basic reproduction number and the proportion of cases that
become severely ill, consistent patterns were observed when
comparing relative magnitudes of avoidable mortality rates across
countries (and also across provinces within countries).
Discussion
Our results indicate that health system resource gaps for
responding to a mild to moderate pandemic influenza scenario are
Table 1. Summary of estimated resource gaps for a modeled pandemic influenza scenario.
Cambodia Indonesia* Lao PDR Thailand Taiwan* Vietnam
No. of provinces 24 15 17 76 25 63
Oseltamivir:
No. (%) of provinces with a gap 24 (100) 1 (6.7) 13 (76.5) 40 (52.6) 11 (44.0) 5 (7.9)
Overall gap/surplus (excluding central stockpile){ 29508.4 11449 2193.1 43746.5 13189.8 63964.5
Central stockpile{ 31114 n/a{ 1445.6 513411 487000 n/a{
Overall gap/surplus (including central stockpile){ 21605.6 11449.0{ 1252.5 557157.5 500190{ 63964.5
Hospital beds:
No. (%) of provinces with a gap 21 (87.5) 10 (66.7) 16 (94.1) 24 (31.6) 1 (4.0) 32 (50.8)
Overall gap/surplus 2661.6 507.8 2365.3 3941 11031.2 1235.2
Ventilators:
No. (%) of provinces with a gap 24 (100) 15 (100) 17 (100) 64 (84.2) 1 (4) 63 (100)
Overall gap/surplus 2440.4 2350.6 2190.1 2688.1 987.6 22465.9
Doctors:
No. (%) of provinces with a gap 21 (87.5) 5 (33.3) 15 (88.2) 67 (88.2) 3 (12) 2 (3.2)
Overall gap/surplus 219.3 1504.4 278.3 21024.5 3682.5 2113.6
Nurses:
No. (%) of provinces with a gap 12 (50) 5 (33.3) 10 (58.8) 8 (10.5) 2 (8) 1 (1.6)
Overall gap/surplus 139.9 1021.7 244.7 3348.7 12277.4 6012.5
(Estimates are for comparative purposes only, and highly sensitive to model parameters and assumptions. They should not be interpreted as precise quantitative
indications of resource gaps that may occur in a pandemic influenza scenario.)
*Data for Indonesia are from across districts (not provinces) in Jakarta and Bali only, and data for Taiwan are across counties.
{Values for oseltamivir represent the number of treatment courses.
{Data on central stockpiles of oseltamivir were not available for Indonesia and Vietnam.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.t001
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wide and vary greatly, both within and between countries in
Southeast Asia, and that these gaps could have a profound impact
on pandemic-associated mortalities. Our estimates of resource
gaps and avoidable mortality rates at country level show a clear
association with national GDP. This result is consistent with a
previous analysis of data from the 1918 influenza pandemic, which
found that per capita income explained a large proportion of the
variation in mortality across countries during the pandemic period
[14]. Moreover, extrapolation of these mortality rates to the 2004
world population suggested that around 96% of deaths from
pandemic influenza would occur in developing countries [14]. Our
results suggest that, due to inequitable distribution of resources,
the variation in pandemic burden is likely to be profound within,
as well as between, countries.
Countries which have experienced the highest burden of Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (H5N1), namely Vietnam and
Indonesia, appear to be most prepared in terms of the availability
and geographical distribution of oseltamivir. In the other study
countries, we estimated that central stockpiles of oseltamivir would
be sufficient to cover any provincial gaps for treating all severe
cases from the modeled scenario, and thus mobilization of this
resource could potentially avert a large number of avoidable
mortalities in these countries. Indeed, in all countries except
Vietnam, we estimated that optimum mobilization of resources
across administrative boundaries could save more than 10% of
avoidable deaths. While timely mobilization of resources may be
possible in Taiwan, with its small geographical size and relatively
developed infrastructure, the feasibility of this scenario is
questionable in the poorer, and larger, countries of the Mekong
region, where it might be prudent to disburse central stockpiles of
antiviral drugs to provincial and district health facilities prior to an
outbreak.
Gaps in mechanical ventilators were predicted to be a major
cause of avoidable deaths, with almost all provinces across all
countries estimated to have severe shortages of this of this
resource, with the exception of Taiwan and some Thai provinces.
This pattern likely reflects the relatively high cost and human
resource skills associated with acquisition and operation of
ventilators, and highlights the importance of developing robust
triage criteria as part of pandemic preparedness plans to ensure
that this resource is allocated to the patients who are most likely
benefit [29–30]. A previous analysis similarly suggested that a dire
shortage of mechanical ventilators would be a major limiting
factor in responding to a pandemic influenza outbreak in the
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of estimated avoidable mortality rates due to resource gaps for a modeled pandemic influenza
scenario. Values are mapped at province level for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam, at county level for Taiwan, and at district level for
Jakarta and Bali in Indonesia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.g002
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United States [31]. We found particularly wide variation in the
availability of ventilators, and indeed other hospital resources, in
Thailand, where our results suggest that inequitable distribution of
health system resources [32], rather than simply an overall
nationwide shortage, could lead to a high number of avoidable
deaths from pandemic influenza.
Of course, hospital equipment such as beds and ventilators are
useless unless sufficient and qualified human resources are
available to treat influenza patients, and our results suggest that
gaps in healthcare workers would also be an important limiting
factor for responding to pandemic influenza in many countries,
particularly for Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand.
It is encouraging that total donor funds committed to avian and
human influenza broadly correspond to avoidable mortality rates
estimated at country level. A recent paper on Financial and
Technical Assistance from the 2010 International Ministerial
Conference on Animal and Pandemic Influenza (IMCAPI) reports
that over 50% of total donor funding committed towards avian
and human influenza worldwide between 2005 and 2009 was
allocated towards ‘‘human health and pandemic preparedness’’
(with other funds committed towards sectors such as animal
health; monitoring, information, and internal coordination; and
information, education and communication) [28]. However, the
extent to which these funds have been, or will be, allocated
Figure 3. Estimated avoidable mortality rates due to each resource gap across countries for a modeled pandemic influenza
scenario. Deaths attributed to shortages of oseltamivir, hospital beds, and ventilators are estimated from the number of deaths that the model
predicts would be prevented by filling the gap in each of these resources alone. Boxplots show medians, interquartile ranges, and 95th percentile
ranges derived from a multivariate uncertainty analysis. Data are aggregated across provinces for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam, and across
counties for Taiwan. Data for Indonesia are aggregated across districts of Jakarta and Bali only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.g003
Figure 4. Association of predicted avoidable mortality rates with gross domestic product (A) and donor funding (B). Data on gross
domestic product at product purchasing power (GDP at PPP) for 2009, obtained from the World Economic Outlook Database-April 2010, International
Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/, accessed April 21st 2010). Donor funds represent the total committed towards avian and human influenza up to
December 2009, as reported in International Financial and Technical Assistance report for the International Ministerial Conference on Animal and
Pandemic Influenza-2010, Hanoi, Vietnam (http://www.imcapi-hanoi-2010.org/documents/en/, accessed June 18th 2010). *Avoidable mortality rates
for Indonesia are estimated from Jakarta and Bali only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.g004
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towards mitigating the resource gaps identified in our study is
unknown to us and beyond the scope of this analysis.
This study is subject to several limitations, many of which relate
to assumptions that were necessary for the modeled scenario. For
example, in our baseline scenario we assumed that 12% of hospital
capacity, across all provinces and countries, would be available to
care for the surge of patients with influenza infections. In reality,
surge capacity is likely to vary substantially between and within
countries (and over time), but few data on this are available.
Robust analytical frameworks are urgently needed to define and
measure health system surge capacity in order to inform analyses
of resource gaps for emergency response scenarios. The effective-
ness of resources such as antiviral drugs, ventilators, and general
hospital care for improving the survival rates among severe
influenza cases is also surrounded by considerable uncertainty and
may vary between settings. Our results show that, even if
epidemiological parameters describing transmission and pathoge-
nicity are kept constant, uncertainties in spare capacity and
resource effectiveness lead to considerable uncertainties in
estimates of avoidable mortalities rates. Nevertheless, the distri-
butions of model outputs from our multivariate uncertainty
analysis still showed some significant differences when compared
across countries and across resource types (Figures 3 and 5).
Furthermore, it seems likely that spare capacity and resource
effectiveness would be higher in more resource-rich settings, which
would only strengthen the findings of this study in terms of the
geographic distribution of resource gaps and avoidable mortalities.
Estimates of resource gaps and avoidable mortality rates were
also very sensitive to parameters describing pandemic severity,
although similar patterns were observed across geographic areas
for the range of values explored. However, the same cannot be
said for the relative importance of gaps in different resource types.
Thus, although our results generally suggest that shortages of
ventilators could be a major cause of avoidable deaths in low- and
middle-income countries in Southeast Asia, investment in this
resource should not necessarily be prioritized over other
healthcare resources. A natural extension of this study would be
to investigate the cost-effectiveness of investing different types of
health systems resources for mitigating the burden of an influenza
pandemic. However, more data on the effectiveness of different
resources for managing severe influenza cases is needed before
such assessments can be made.
Other limitations relate to the simplicity of the model structure.
We assumed homogenous mixing and a constant basic reproduc-
tion number across all populations. In reality, heterogeneities in
factors such as age-structure, geographic structure, population
density, human behavior, and the underlying health of the
population are all likely to play a role in transmission dynamics
and burden of influenza. A previous modeling analysis, for
example, has shown that higher levels of population heterogene-
ities, such as in age and spatial structuring of contacts, result in
lower overall attack rates and peak prevalence for a given basic
reproduction number [33]. However, there is a lack of data on
such heterogeneities and how they might affect patterns of
pandemic progression for our study region. Ongoing studies, such
as contact pattern surveys in Asia similar to those undertaken in
Europe [34], are attempting to rectify this. Another limitation is
that the resource data were collected between May and September
2009, which includes the first wave of the H1N1-2009 pandemic;
thus some resource data (particularly for antiviral stockpiles) may
be influenced by the time point within this period at which the
data were recorded.
Given the above caveats, it is important to emphasize that we do
not advocate these results to be accurate quantitative reflections of
resources shortages or deaths that are likely to occur in any given
pandemic scenario. Rather, they highlight the scale of health
system inequalities within and across countries in Asia, and the
considerable impact such inequalities could have on the pandemic
disease burden. By indicating the relative disparities in resource
availability within and across countries, and the potential
consequences of resource shortages, these results could help guide
investment decisions in scaling up resources to mitigate the burden
Figure 5. Estimated impact of resource mobilization/redistribution across provinces on avoidable mortality rates within each
territory. Data were calculated by estimating the number of avoidable deaths if available resources (including central stockpiles for oseltamivir)
within each territory were geographically distributed in proportion to provincial population size, and comparing with the total number of avoidable
deaths predicted given actual resource distribution. Boxplots show medians, interquartile ranges, and 95th percentile ranges derived from a
multivariate uncertainty analysis. Data are aggregated across provinces for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, Vietnam, and across counties for Taiwan.
Data for Indonesia are aggregated across districts of Jakarta and Bali only.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0031800.g005
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of future pandemics. As many of these resources have a generic
healthcare function beyond pandemic influenza, they may also be
useful to guide health system strengthening.
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